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Abstract
In order to explain the apparently paradoxical presence of acceptable governance in
many non-democratic regimes, economists and political scientists have focused mostly on
institutions acting as de facto checks and balances. In this paper, we propose that pop-
ulation plays a similar role in guaranteeing the quality of governance and redistribution.
We argue and demonstrate with historical evidence that the concentration of population
around the policy making center serves as an insurgency threat to a dictatorship, inducing
it to yield to more redistribution and better governance. We bring this centered concept
of population concentration to the data through the Centered Index of Spatial Concentra-
tion developed by Do & Campante (2008). The evidence supports our predictions: only in
the sample of autocracies, population concentration around the capital city is positively
associated with better governance and more redistribution (proxied by post-tax inequal-
ity), in OLS and IV regressions. Finally, we provide arguments to dismiss possible reverse
causation as well as alternative, non-political economy explanations of such regularity,
discuss the general applicability of our index and conclude with policy implications.
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1 Introduction
Why do some dictatorships perform much better than others? Throughout human history, and
still true to this date, nations have most commonly been governed by dictatorships, systems
of coercive power where elections are at best political tools of legitimization. This form of
government, while inherently undesirable in its restriction of freedom as compared to democ-
racy,1 is no perfect predictor of disastrous economic governance. Examples of rapid growth and
development under regimes hostile to free elections are numerous, ranging from Britain during
the industrial revolution to post-Mao China. The spectrum of autocracies indeed covers a wide
range of heterogeneous performance2, as shown for instance in Figure 1, which plots the measure
of the Rule of Law in 1996 gathered by Kaufman, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2006, henceforth KKM)
against the polity score from the POLITY IV dataset (2004). There is a clear cutoff point
at the polity score of 5, as endorsed by Fearon (2007): while among the democratic countries
(polity score>5) the relationship in question is very clear, the case of non-democratic countries
(polity score≤5) is full of idiosyncrasy. This particularity urges for a better understanding of
how autocracies produce governance. After all, when elections are not a choice, then what are
the mechanisms that can induce dictators, or the ruling elites, to instate and maintain good
laws and policies?
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
In this paper, we contribute to answering these questions by proposing and asserting the
case for one factor that could arguably predict “less bad” dictatorships from “bad” ones. That
factor is population. More specifically, our thesis emphasizes the role of the concept of popula-
tion concentration around the capital city as de facto checks and balances in autocratic regimes,
begetting better governance and more redistribution towards the disadvantaged fraction of the
population. This theoretical idea is based on a simple model of revolution threat previously
studied in Campante & Do (2007).3 Accordingly, since dissent voices are hardly heard through
democratic channels in an autocracy, when the poor are numerous and concentrated around
1There is a strong case for the intrinsic desirability of democracy originating from political philosophy, as
demonstrated by Sen(1999).
2The similar observation is made by Rodrik (2000), Almeida & Ferreira (2002), Glaeser et al. (2004), among
others.
3We will only briefly discuss the noticeable role of population size, as it has been studied at length in this
paper.
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the political center of the country, they incubate a greater threat of insurgency attempt, as the
expected gains from a revolution quickly outweigh the possible losses (similar to DiPasquale
& Glaeser, 1998). The insurrection menace leads the regime to use different preemptive mea-
sures to stay in power, including constructive methods such as improved economic policies and
effectiveness, bettered voices and accountability, controlled corruption, and redistribution tar-
geted to the destitute group that constitutes the largest threat. We thus predict a positive
relationship between higher population concentration around the capital city and governance
indices as well as redistribution (measured by the differentiating effects on pre- and post-tax
inequalities); furthermore, it prevails only in non-democratic countries, not in democracies. In
addition, when governance is controlled for, the threat measured by population concentration
leads to lower political stability and higher use of repression.
The body of empirical evidence robustly verifies our theoretical predictions. In order to mea-
sure population concentration around the capital cities, we apply the concept of the Centered
Index of Spatial Concentration developed in Do & Campante (2008) to world population map
data in 1990. First, regarding governance in the sample of non-democratic countries (defined
by the threshold of polity score of 5), we consistently find a sizeable, significant positive rela-
tionship between population concentration and five out of six of KKM’s governance indicators,
namely control of corruption, voice and accountability, rule of law, government effectiveness and
quality of regulations, and expectedly no such link with the last indicator, political stability. A
worthy example comes from the comparison between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, both belonging
to the same region and religion, both best described as distinctly autocratic, both having huge
reserves of natural resources, wherefrom maintaining a similarly high level of GDP per capita:
Kuwait is much more concentrated around its own capital, thus under more scrutiny and pres-
sure from its own people, and predictably, has substantially better governance. Moreover, when
governance indicators is controlled for, we do find a negative correlation between population
concentration and political stability. We also find evidence that higher concentration breeds
a better funded military force, a proxy of the use of repression. Second, within the sample
of autocracies, population concentration is also associated with lower post-tax inequality, but
not pre-tax inequality, suggesting the link with redistribution. Such link is shown to operate
mostly with respect to the poorest quintile of the population, again consistent with our the-
oretical account of revolution threat and redistribution to the poorest. All of these empirical
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regularities fail to reproduce in the sample of democratic countries, underlying the particularity
of population concentration in autocracies, and thus dismissing a few alternative explanations.
The case of the causal link between population concentration and governance and redistribution
outcomes is strengthened by the use of land area, lagged life expectancy, and lagged population
growth rate, as IVs for population concentration and population size. We also discuss specific
cases of endogenous capital city locations and shown a pattern of deteriorating governance con-
sistent with our theory. In sum, the empirical results strongly support the influential role of
population concentration in autocracies, while equally emphasizing the empirical importance
of our methodological approach to this concept.
Our contribution builds on a fast growing literature that examines the working of autoc-
racies, from Barrington Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966) to Ace-
moglu & Robinson’s Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (2005), as our theoretical
focus on revolutions has been central in both texts. On the other hand, we are less interested
in actual revolutions that may give birth to democracies: in this aspect, we are closer to Bueno
de Mesquita et al. (2003) and Besley & Kudamatsu’s (2007) treatment of non-democratic
regimes. Most of this literature focuses on the institutions that motivate or limit dictators (e.g.
Gehlbach & Keefer (2007) on investment promotion, Besley & Prat (forthcoming) on media
capture), while our paper discusses the case of a non-institutional factor, namely population.
Population size has been suggested to increase the threat of revolts in works by Grossman &
Iyigun (1997) and Fearon & Laitin (2003), an important link in the construction of our theory.
On the other hand, population concentration is argued to correlate with autocratic regimes
(Ades & Glaeser, 1995)4 and civil wars (Collier & Hoeﬄer, 2004).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a narrative discussion of
our theory of political influence with historical facts supporting its two main links. Section 3
calculates population concentration on cross-country data and utilizes it to test the theoretical
predictions. Section 4 discusses further uses of our index before concluding.
4Compared to Ades & Glaeser, we study a different direction of causation, and emphasize the need of a
correct measure of concentration.
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2 Population Concentration, Insurrections and Preemp-
tion - Theory and Historical Support
“It is not admissible that fifty individuals in the Republic’s capital be able to
unsettle and threaten fifty million Brazilians. ”
Juscelino Kubitschek, President of Brazil (1956-60)5
2.1 Brief Summary of Theory
We follow the theoretical model studied in Campante & Do (2007), with an emphasis on popula-
tion concentration over population size. In an autocratic regime where the people are relatively
deprived of voices through institutional channels, the presence of a large mass of relatively
poor people concentrated around the capital city accentuates the risk of a spontaneous attempt
of insurrection that threatens to topple down an unpopular government. In anticipation, the
government could take preemptive measures to reduce this pool of potential rebels as well as
divert their interest away from subversive activities, by extending the franchise, redistributing
more to the poor, improving voice and accountability, controlling corruption, and creating eco-
nomic opportunities, especially around the capital city – measures that we call “constructive
counter-revolution methods”. We argue that through this mechanism, the poor mass are able
to keep the government honest in autocratic regimes.
Intuitively, the government should adjust its counter-revolution measures so that the marginal
effectiveness of insurrection prevention equates the marginal cost. A larger, poorer mass that
is more concentrated around the capital city clearly presents a higher threat of insurgency,
because individual costs are reduced more than individual expected gains (Grossman & Iyigun,
1997, and DiPasquale & Glaeser, 1998), and that there is a larger pool of rebels to draw from
(Fearon & Laitin, 2003). In presence of a magnified “supply” of insurgency threat, the marginal
impact of prevention is enlarged, thus in equilibrium the government is willing to pay more to
reduce the insurrection menace. With the availability of repressive methods, the increased de-
mand for counter-revolution measures is likely to imply that some constructive methods will
be used, unless the substitution possibility of repressive methods is so large that repression
overwhelms constructive developments. With some complementarity between the repressive
5Quoted in Couto (2001). The translation is our own.
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and the constructive methods, an additional prediction is that population concentration also
positively affects measures of repression. On the other hand, the combination of a higher po-
tential threat and more reactions have no unambiguous implications on the actual occurrence
of revolutions, or by the same token, political stability. Political stability is negatively affected
by the threat of revolutions only when the constructive measures are controlled for. The link
from population concentration to political and economic outcomes is hence stated as follows:
Proposition 1 In non-democratic countries, the concentration of the poor population around
the capital city leads to better governance, more accountability of the government, more redis-
tribution, but also more repression. While its aggregate effect on political stability is ambiguous,
when governance variables are controlled for population concentration leads to lower political
stability. Additionally, these effects are not present in democratic countries.
2.2 Revolutions and Population Concentration
A brief look at the main revolutions in the past two centuries shows just how important the
population around the capital city is, in countries where democratic channels of voice are obscure
at best. When an insurrection erupts from the citizenry’s anger and misery, it usually draws its
pioneering supporters from the “revolutionaries” who take root in the streets of the capital and
its neighboring regions, before eventually attracting waves of insurgents under its revolutionary
banner. From the start to the eventual accomplishment of an insurrection, physical contact
with the stronghold of the government matters critically, inasmuch as a revolution from remote
lands always needs to pay monumental costs to lay siege to the government. A relatively
small mob in the capital city thence has as much political influence as a huge group of rebels
elsewhere. In that case, a dictator-ruled capital city (or the region surrounding it) that is full
of poor dissidents bears a huge risk of insurgency.
A classic example is Paris’s transition century from the Ancien Re´gime to the Third Repub-
lic. On the Eve of the Ancien Re´gime, Paris with her 550 thousands inhabitants certainly did
not represent the average (or “median”) opinion of some 29 million Frenchmen, among which
many royalists willing to defend the monarchy at all costs;6 yet the Parisian crowd held far
6National and city population figures come from estimates of McEvedy & Jones, 1978, and Braudel, 1986.
Braudel observed that France at the end of the Ancien Re´gime was still very much a rural country. Later on,
royalist counter-revolutionaries rioted in Brittany, La Vande´e and Dauphine´, regions too far from Paris to make
any difference.
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more revolutionary power than residents anywhere else, because of their proximity to power.
As described by Tilly (2003 p.162-167), the dense population of Paris made it inevitable that
in times of trouble large brawls occurred regularly; it did not take much time to see the rise
of sizeable mobs such as the crowd that stormed the Bastille on July 14, 1789, or the one that
assaulted the Tuileries and arrested Louis XVI and his family on August 10, 1792. The risk
of revolution starting from a large, concentrated capital is hardly negligible to any dictator or
monarch who does not want to be guillotined.
In a similar vein, Mark Traugott’s (1995) detailed analysis of Paris and French insurrections
during the following century emphasizes the idea that - “In general, the rural population proved
acquiescent, but the will of the capital initially held sway even when the numerical majority
living in the countryside seemed resistant to the change.” While not all Parisian insurrections
managed to change the status quo like those in 1830 and 1848 did, they have indeed occurred
in a repetitive pattern: 1827, 1832, 1834, 1839, 1848, 1849, 1851, 1869, and 1871. Interestingly,
insurrections of considerable size originating in other places around the country, including
the 1831 and 1834 revolts of the canuts, or silk workers, in Lyon, the second largest city,
“systematically failed to produce comparable repercussions at the national level unless they
coincide with unrest in the capital” (see Bezucha, 1974 and Montagne, 1966). Even when the
workers-insurgents of Lyon managed to capture the whole city both times, it was certainly of
minor concern to the freshly instituted monarch Louis-Philippe who later subdued them with
ease by large, professional armies. In comparison, in 1848 the very same King, then much more
entrenched in his throne, succumbed to the Parisian crowd and abdicated after less than three
days of revolution, failing to mobilize even the troops at his immediate disposal to confront the
populace. As Traugott synopsizes, during this period the change of regime in France is best
described as “as Paris goes, so goes the nation”.7
The logic of revolution stemming from population concentration is by no means limited
to the relatively large countries like nineteenth century France. The much-loved example of
comparative historians is the year of revolutions, 1848 8 Among the 30 most populated cities
7Traugott also proposes several explanatory factors bearing a sharp similarity to our theory. He emphasizes
the densely concentrated Paris of all classes, that first creates the direct threat of aggression towards the
notables, and second increases the vulnerability of the poorest, pushing them to destitution because of grain
price inflation, making their revolt costless and inescapable in their eyes.
8Dowe et al.’s 2001 edited volume provides trenchant accounts of the 1848 Revolutions.
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in Europe in 1800, 11 of the top 15 were shocked by the revolutionary wave9, most of them
were capital cities of sovereign or vassal states; while none of the next 15 except Copenhagen
(16th) and Prague (30th) (again, capital cities) were touched. Incited by the harsh economic
conditions following a widespread economic slum (Berger & Spoerer 2001), the large masses of
the poor in these capitals quickly exploded into large scale revolts that in many cases resulted
in important changes in the political landscape of Europe.
These patterns of revolutions are not confined to pre-modern history. The recent “color
revolutions” in post-communist countries offer very similar stylized facts. In the Ukrainian
Orange Revolution of 2004/05, The Economist states that “Kiev’s key lesson [on revolutions]
is that numbers are all-important: 5,000 or even 15,000 people can be violently dispersed;
50,000 are a different proposition.” (March 18th, 2006). It is all the more striking that the
protesters in the streets of Kiev did not necessarily represent the true proportions of supporters
and opposition of the incumbent government, which albeit enjoying landslide victories in the
Pro-Russian East of Ukraine, could not mobilize that fraction of the population because the
opposition population is much more concentrated around Kiev. The 5th October Revolution in
Serbia in 2000, the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan
in 2005 have very similar patterns. In terms of costs the insurgents have to pay, these examples
of revolutions next door stand in sharp contrast with those based from remote lands. Most of
the latter fail to disturb the reign; even when they succeed, they usually pay enormous costs,
in time (Laurent-De´sire´ Kabila waited in the jungle East of (then) Zaire for more than 30 years
to depose Mbutu in 1997) and lives (of which the Chinese Communist Long March to Yan’an
is an illuminating example).
In sum, the population concentrated around the capital city matters much more than else-
where, when it comes to voicing discontent sentiments through non-democratic channels such
as revolutions and riots, instead of democratic elections. With a larger, poorer pool of citizens
comes a higher risk of turmoil. Because they live in the neighborhood of the political center,
their violence is felt with no delay, and for a relatively low cost igniting a chain of sequential
events that draw waves of people onto the revolutionary “bandwagon”, once again depending
on the concentration of the poor, easy to mobilize mass.10
9They are Paris, Naples, Vienna, Amsterdam, Berlin, Rome, Palermo, Venice, Milan, Hamburg and Lyon;
the other four are London, Dublin, Lisbon, Madrid. City population data are from Bairoch et al., 1988.
10This “bandwagon” or “domino” effect is also consistent with existing models of revolutions proposed by
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2.3 Compromise From the Elite as a Constructive Counter-Revolution
Measure
Historical accounts of counter-revolution measures are equally abundant of compromises made
by the ruling elite. While repressive measures are also common, dictatorships do seriously
consider yielding several rights and privileges to the mass as a means to placate revolutionary
threats.
Acemoglu & Robinson (2000) provide a comprehensive exploratory discussion of the exten-
sion of the franchise in the West in the nineteenth century, following the British experience first
in 1832, and then in 1867 and 1884. Such moves were oftentimes accompanied by increased
redistribution and liberalized economic opportunities, at the expense of the powerful and rich
proponents of these democratizing laws. They were by and large motivated by the desire to
preserve orders in the face of unprecedented political unrest that threatened to culminate into
a widespread revolution. As the authors argued, the threat of revolution was by far the most
important factor accounting for the democratization of the British political environment, com-
pared to alternative explanations on grounds of the Enlightenment of the elite, partisan political
struggle, or a middle class drive. Indeed, the policies of compromise have spared Britain from
the 1848 revolutionary wave. Similar examples are found in the making of the providence State
in Germany, as noted by Williamson (1998) (cited by Acemoglu & Robinson): “the main aim
of [Bismarck’s] welfare program was to avoid revolution through timely social reform and to
reconcile the working class to the authority of the state.”, or Sweden, as Tilton (1974, p. 568)
remarked “Swedish democracy had triumphed without a revolution–but not without the threat
of a revolution.”
Traugott’s treatment of nineteenth century France shows another aspect of compromise
by the ruling elite: when the mass get their rights, revolutions no longer succeed. The most
important factor that differs the pre-1848 and post-1848 periods, argues Traugott, is the new
principles of equality before the law, freedom of the press, and the rights of assembly and
association which came into practice thanks partly to the triumphant Parisian crowds. As party
politics began to form, insurrections declined sharply, and when it did occur as in 1871, it was
no longer able to gather enough support from all walks of life.11 The declaration of the Third
Granovetter (1978), Kuran (1989, 1995).
11Traugott also mentioned the decline of concentration of the poor at the heart of Paris, and transportation
improvement that stabilized food prices in the capital, as main factors leading to the downtrend of insurrections,
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Republic finally instituted the rule of democratic practices, in lieu of Parisian insurrections.
From a comparative angle, the logic of population concentration and serious insurrection
threat elucidates the much discussed gap of redistribution between the United States and West-
ern Europe, as highlighted by Alesina and Glaeser (2004). They note that “America’s vast
geographic spread ensured that despite the dramatic success of many early labor groups in the
United States, it was impossible to organize an effective nationwide movement that threatened
the entire nation.” (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, p. 107) They also proceed to observe how im-
portant rebellions could not gather enough momentum so as to topple the national government
due to the distance between their epicenters in major population centers such as New York and
the political capital in Washington, DC. This missing link is at work in all Western European
countries, producing the actual redistribution as we could predict and observe.
In sum, historical evidence shows that in many cases the ruling elite needs to appease
insurgency threats by either extending democratic institutions for more voices and scrutiny
from the mass, or redistributing economic rents and opportunities to the poor population, and
usually both. Together with the elements of revolutions discussed in the previous section, it
implies an important role of population concentration in shaping the political and economic
policy landscape.
3 Empirical Results
For empirical purposes we choose to use the Gravity-based CISC (Do & Campante, 2008)
that measures concentration around the capital city using the average logarithm of distance
to the capital city as shown in the following formula: I =
∫
population
log(distance(x,C))dµ(x).
The measure satisfies a set of natural axioms, and also exhibits additional properties that are
desirable for empirical purposes: it could effectively disentangle the “gravitational force” of
the capital city from other local forces in any other points. We devote the first part of the
implementation to an empirical description and justification of the index, compared to other
measures of concentration. The second part tests the predictions of our theory: that population
concentration predicts better governance and more redistribution towards the poor.
an explanation that rhymes well with our story of revolutions.
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3.1 Description of Data
We calculate population concentration around capital cities across countries in the world using
the database Gridded Population of the World (GPW), Version 3 from the Socio-Economic
Data Center (SEDC) at Columbia University. This dataset, published in 2005, contains the
information for the years 1990, 1995 and 2000, and is arguably the most detailed world pop-
ulation map available. Over the course of more than 10 years, these data are gathered from
national censuses and transformed into a global grid of 2.5 arc-minute side cells (approximately
5km, or 3 miles), with data on population for each of the cells in this grid. 12
We compute two different versions of our index of population concentration (henceforth
denoted PCI). The first version (PCI1) is normalized by population size and the maximum
distance across countries, while the second version (PCI2) is normalized by population size
and the maximum distance within the country (PCI2), both as described in section ??.
13 The
former captures concentration relative to what it could possibly be in any country, while the
latter captures concentration relative to what it could possibly be in that specific country. We
have thus taken out the information mechanically related to population size in PCI1, and in
addition information mechanically related to geographical size in PCI2.
14
3.2 Comparison of Population Concentration Across Different Mea-
sures
Table 1 shows the basic descriptive statistics for the two versions of the index, for the three
years in the sample, and Table 2 presents their correlation. Tables 1 and 2 also present the
descriptive statistics and correlation with representative alternative measures of concentration,
as discussed in section ??. The first alternative is the location Gini coefficient, a non-centered
measure most often used in the political economy literature, the second one is the inverse of
the average distance (“Inv Avg Dist”), a centered index borrowed from the urban planning
12We limit our analysis to countries with more than one million inhabitants, since most of the examples with
extremely high levels of concentration come from small countries and islands. The results with the full sample
are very much similar and are available upon request.
13Alternatively, PCI2 could be normalized by (log) land area, instead of (log) maximum distance within the
country, so as to avoid possible cases of very large distances within one single country without any appropriate
connection to its size (i.e. if the Falkland Islands were counted as part of the UK in the data.) In practice,
this delivers very similar results in all aspects. We thus choose the normalization procedure that is more easily
interpretable.
14While the non-normalized measure may present some interest in itself, we do not report it because of its
extremely high correlation with population size, which prevents us from disentangling any independent effect.
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literature, and the third one is the share of capital city population, or “capital city primacy”,
a convenient measure that is unstable, as it is problematic to specify an artificial boundary of
the capital city. The first two measures are directly calculated from the same gridded map,
while the third is provided by the SEDC as collected from individual country’s statistics15.
The appropriate benchmark is arguably PCI1, and not PCI2, since both location Gini and
Inv Avg Dist, as usually used in the literature, do not normalize by the geographical size of
each country.16
The first remarkable fact is that there is very little variation from 1990 to 2000: the auto-
correlation is extremely high, and almost all variation comes from the cross-country dimension.
This persistence is by no means mechanical, as our index takes into consideration all points on
the map, and is theoretically responsive to any movement with respect to the capital city. Fur-
thermore, compared to the other measures, ours exhibits by far the highest level of persistence.
It thus suggests two intuitive interpretations: first, that the pattern of population distribution
is fairly constant within each country during a period of 10 years, and second, that our index
is perhaps the best to refine the noises produced by migration and landscape development. For
this reason, we choose to focus on PCI1 in one year, 1990, for it has the highest quality of data
as judged by the SEDC.
[TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE]
Most salient in Table 2 is the negative correlation between our index and the location Gini.
This underscores the point that non-centered measures of concentration are ill-suited for the
concept of population concentration around the capital. This point becomes even more striking
when we compare the list of countries with very high and very low levels of concentration, which
are displayed in Table 3. We can see that the list of the countries whose population is least
concentrated around their capital cities accords very well with what was to be expected: these
are by-and-large countries where the capital city is not the largest city. (The exceptions are
Russia, on which we will elaborate later, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whose
capital is located on the far west corner of the country.) The same list for the location Gini,
15Capital city population of African countries in 1990 is missing, but the results are unchanged using similar
measures in 1995.
16We have also undertaken the comparison with other measures, including the use of a linear impact func-
tion, an inverse impact function, and the share of the population in the largest urban extent. All qualitative
conclusions remain similarly strong, but are omitted due to space limitation, and only available upon request.
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in contrast, classifies as “very concentrated” these same countries that have big territories
and unevenly distributed populations. While this concept may of course be useful for many
applications, it is quite apparent that using non-centered measures of concentration can be very
misleading in our centered context.
On the other hand, Table 2 shows the correlation between PCI1 and the alternative centered
index Inv Avg Dist to be positive and relatively high, as was to be expected, though not
overwhelming. Nevertheless, there are very important empirical differences between the two
– in addition to the conceptual properties that our axiomatic approach guarantees. The first
such difference can be seen from Figure 3, which plots histograms of both indices. We can see
from the figure that the distribution of Inv Avg Dist is very skewed, whereas our measure has
a more compelling bell-shaped distribution.17 This implies that our measure is generally less
sensitive to extreme observations, a character that will have its impact felt in the regression
analysis.
[TABLE 3 AND FIGURE 3 HERE]
A second important difference can be illustrated by considering a specific comparison, be-
tween Brazil and Russia. Russia’s capital, Moscow, is the country’s largest city, and is located
at about 600km (slightly less than 400 miles) from the country’s second largest city, St Pe-
tersburg. In contrast, Brazil’s capital, Bras´ılia, is now the country’s sixth largest city, and is
around 900km (more than 550 miles) away from the country’s largest cities, Sa˜o Paulo and
Rio de Janeiro, whose combined metropolitan area population is about ten times as large as
Bras´ılia’s.18 One would thus be led to expect that a measure of population concentration
around the capital city would rank Russia ahead of Brazil. Table 3 shows that this is the
case with our PCI1, but not with Inv Avg Dist. The reason why Inv Avg Dist paints this
relatively distorted picture is that it gives a larger weight to people who are very far from the
capital point of interest; roughly speaking, it gives a relatively large weight to people who are in
Vladivostok. As a result, the measure of concentration tends to be pushed down for countries
with big territories – in fact, this tendency to give extra weight to outliers is also behind the
17The skewness is by no means an artificial product of taking the inverse of average distance: in fact, the
twin measure Neg Avg Dist also exhibits a comparable prevalence of outliers.
18According to official data, the metro area population of Sa˜o Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Bras´ılia is around
19 million, 12 million, and 3 million, respectively.
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skewed distribution that we pointed out in the preceding paragraph. Our measure corrects for
this tendency, and that is why it produces a more intuitive ranking.
The measure of capital city primacy, as shown in Table 2, displays a positive but relatively
low level of correlation with both measures, PCI1 and PCI2. It has by far the highest variation
over time in Table 1. These two observations invite prudence regarding this measure’s quality:
as we have noticed, its outright dependence on the definition of boundary of the capital city
implies a low level of stability, and possibly misleading comparisons across countries. It is
important to remark that although the SEDC’s dataset on capital population estimation pro-
vides arguably the best data available, its definition of the boundary of capital city and urban
extension is still contingent on each country’s statistics, at times coming close to the point of
arbitrariness. A telling example is that of Vietnam, ranked as the second lowest capital city
primacy, since the official population size of what is considered the capital city, Hanoi, is very
small (less than 1%), whereas in reality it is at the heart of a large, heavily populated region
stretching to Vietnam’s whole Northern Plain. In fact, such a case is typical to many developing
countries with a large rural population, in that there cannot be any objective way to delimit
the capital city on population map, while the official boundary is of little use.
In Do & Campante, 2008, we present a fuller account of cross-country correlation between
our index of population concentration, as well as the alternative measures, and several economic
variables. It is with our index that the resulting patterns seem to be most significant and
economically interesting, suggesting that ours is probably the least noisy measure to capture
the concept of population concentration.
3.3 Governance and Population Concentration
We now proceed to assert the theoretical predictions that the concentration of citizens around
the capital is positively associated with better governance, before moving on to discuss the
corresponding causation. We use as dependent variables the six measures of the quality of
governance, compiled by Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006, abbreviated KKM), including
control of corruption, voice and accountability, the rule of law, regulation quality, government
effectiveness and political stability, available for the years 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004,
2005.
Our first set of results, presented in Table 4, shows the regressions of these six variables
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on PCI1 from 1990, controlling for log of population size (as suggested by Campante & Do,
2007), log GDP per capita, ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF ) and polity score of democ-
racy, all in lag to prevent immediate reverse causation. The sample is pooled over the years
1996-2005, and divided into the groups of democratic (panel A) and nondemocratic countries
(panel B). In all regressions, fixed effects for regions, years, and origins of the legal system are
included, in order to treat the concern of confounding patterns common within groups of coun-
tries/observations divided along these lines. The standard errors are clustered at the country
level.19
[TABLE 4 HERE]
For five of the six variables – control of corruption, voice and accountability, government
effectiveness, rule of law, and quality of regulation – a higher degree of concentration around
the capital city strongly predicts higher governance quality only in less democratic countries,
with beta coefficients ranging from 25% to 35%.20 No statistically significant effect is verified
for more democratic countries. This is precisely in line with the idea that the concentration of
population represents a form of checks and balances solely over non-democratic governments.
For the sixth variable, political stability, our theory predicts an ambiguous correlation with
population concentration, factually consistent with the last column of Table 4.
Figure 4 shows a graphical illustration of KKM’s control of corruption and PCI1 (after
controlling for the variables described above, and for simplicity only for the year 1996). The
picture tells a powerful story of population concentration.21 Let us consider the example of
Saudi Arabia (SAU) versus Kuwait (KWT): the two countries belong to the same region, and
compare closely on polity score (both very bad), GDP per capita (oil-rich), while Saudi Arabia
is far more ethnically homogenous (ELF of .18, compared to .66 for Kuwait). However, there is
a big difference in population, and most importantly, population concentration: while Kuwait
is a small country where most people live within a few miles from capital city, Saudi Arabia
possesses a vast desert land unevenly occupied by a scattered population, with several provinces
19Error clustering dismisses the concern that we are simply adding more observations by including all years
in the KKM dataset, while using only one year for PCI1. We have also run the regressions for all the years
individually, and random effect regressions with the pooled data, and confirmed all qualitative results. The
details are available upon request.
20The beta coefficient signifies how much of one standard deviation of the dependent variable results from an
increase of one standard deviation in PCI1.
21When we exclude outliers such as Singapore and Coˆte d’Ivoire, the results remain robust.
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having even higher than the capital province22. This difference shows off in the comparison of
corruption issues: Saudi Arabia is perceived to have far more problems (three quarter of a
standard deviation) than Kuwait.
[FIGURE 4]
Additional prediction on political stability We proceed with the prediction on the im-
pact of population concentration (i.e. the threat of insurrection) on political stability, once
governance variables are controlled for. It is verified with the results shown in Table 5, where
we regress measures of political stability on PCI1, controlling just for KKM’s indicator of voice
and accountability (columns 1 and 5), as well as all other governance indicators (the other
columns). Columns 5 and 6 show that KKM’s measure of political stability is negatively in-
fluenced by PCI1 among nondemocratic countries, while that effect is absent in the sample
of democratic countries. Columns 7 and 8 show similar results for other measures of stability,
namely the average actual tenures of the chief executive and of the party in power, as imple-
mented in Campante, Chor & Do (2007). These are calculated from the empirical probability
of remaining in power each year over a moving window of 20 years, using a manually collected
dataset from http://www.worldstatesmen.org. The result is robust for the average tenure of
the chief executive, while it is marginally significant (p-value = 0.14) for the average tenure of
the party in power. Reassuringly, the beta coefficients are of the same order of magnitude for
these very different proxies of stability.
[TABLE 5]
Additional prediction on repressive measures Table 6 checks the possible impact of
population concentration on repressive measures by looking at the share of military spending
in the central government’s budget and arms imports as proxies for repression, separately for
nondemocratic and democratic countries. There is a strong association between PCI1 and the
dependent variables only in the sample of nondemocratic countries as expected from our theory.
[TABLE 6]
22The province of the capital city, Al Riyadh, is by far the largest in land area, yet has about 4.5 million
inhabitants (1999), compared to the small province of Mecca with 5.8 million. Our calculation shows that Saudi
Arabia’s PCI1 would be maximized if the capital city is located in between Mecca and Riyadh, but even if it
were the case, its PCI1 would still be as low.
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3.3.1 Robustness checks
Alternative explanations We first examine possible alternative explanations and show that
once they are controlled for, our channel of impact is still robust. As an example, we focus on
the wide variation of KKM’s measure of the rule of law, shown in Figure 1 for nondemocratic
countries. The results are demonstrated in Table 7.
[TABLE 7]
Column 1 shows the regression with PCI1 as the only explanatory variable. While the
literature has discussed very good reasons to take into account the basic set of control variables
used in all regressions including log GDP per capita, population size, polity score (e.g. Treisman,
2000) and ethno-linguistic fractionalization (from Alesina et al., 2003), column 1 asserts that
our qualitative results remain robust even in case these control variables are flawed. Taking
into account the full set of control variables, as shown in column 3, dampens the effect found
in column 1. Columns 2 and 4 show results similar to columns 1 and 3, except that they focus
on the sample of the year 1996 only.23 alleviating the concern that we need the pooled sample
to make our point.
Columns 5 to 10 control for different factors of influence on governance. More specifically,
column 5 includes fuel exports and ore and metal exports to treat the impact of the availability
of resources on governance as suggested by Ades and Di Tella (1999). Column 6 includes the
measure of openness (imports plus exports as a share of total GDP) to take into account the
pressure for better practices of governance from trade partners and international investors, as
well as for risk diversification as shown by Rodrik (1998). Column 7 controls for the dummy
whether the regime is presidential or parliamentary, taken from Kunicova’s (2005) suggestion
that presidential systems tend to have worse governance. Column 8 follows the lead of Pers-
son, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003) in controlling for the measure of whether legislative seats are
allocated under a plurality vote rule, which in principle promotes more accountability from
individual politicians. Column 9 includes for three proxies for the strength of the autocratic
regime, including the majority share of the ruling coalition in the parliament, the fractional-
ization of the ruling coalition (along party lines), and the fractionalization of the opposition
231996 is the first year KKM’s data are available. The results are very similar for other years, and are available
upon request.
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(along party lines): A strong dictatorship could in principle both impose a low level of concen-
tration through migration restriction or capital city location choice, and afford bad governance.
Column 10 controls for the size of the government (measured by government expenditure) to
show that the effect on governance is not just an artifact from larger governments. Throughout
these columns, the estimated coefficient for PCI1 remain strong and robustly significant, and
of the same order of magnitude.
Columns 11 and 12 control for different geographical aspects that may correlate with pop-
ulation concentration. Column 11 includes the hypothetical value of PCI1 if the population of
each country is evenly distributed over its territory; it thus controls for the shape of the country,
given the population size. Column 12 includes the population share of all urban extents in a
country, a measure of urbanization based on the demarkation of cities as urban extents by the
dataset Gridded Population of the World.24 Once again, these factors do not seem to affect our
qualitative result on population concentration.
Instrumental variable for population concentration The range of control variables dis-
cussed in the previous section might still miss out certain unobservables that could have in-
fluenced both population concentration and governance. We now turn to treat this potential
source of bias by finding instrumental variables for population concentration. A preliminary
examination of the determinants of population concentration (see Do & Campante 2007) shows
the role of population size and land area in negatively predicting population concentration. In
our first set of IV regressions shown in Table 8A, we use (log of) land area as an IV for PCI1.
[TABLE 8A HERE]
The first stage shows a strong, negative relationship between land area and PCI1 (the F-stat
is very high), as a larger land size is associated with lower concentration around the capital
city. The second stage results from Table 8A are thus interpretable as the impact of population
concentration around the capital city on governance indicators, as long as there is no omitted
channel of influence from land size to governance that has not already been controlled for by
our standard set of control variables, as well as by the extensive set used in Table 7. Under
this exclusion condition, table 8A shows statistically significant impacts of PCI1 on control of
24We have also used the alternative measure of urbanization as calculated by the United Nation, and obtaining
the same result.
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corruption, rule of law, regulation quality, and on political stability controlling for the other
governance indicators.
There still remains a concern of endogeneity: Population size is shown to be highly cor-
related with population concentration, and could be potentially endogenous. We address this
issue by introducing two more IVs for population size, namely 5-year lag life expectancy at
birth and 5-year lag growth of population size. They are intuitively related to population size
across countries, as a country with higher life expectancy in the past tends to have larger pop-
ulation today, and a country with lower population growth in the near past is likely to be in a
later stage of demographic transition, therefore larger in population size. Table 8B shows the
corresponding regressions, with very strong first stage F-stats for both population size and pop-
ulation concentration. The second stage results are stronger than in Table 8A, with significant
estimates for PCI1 with all governance indicators, and for population size with all governance
indicators but political stability. The use of three IVs for two instrumented variables also al-
lows the Hansen-Sargan overidentification test: all regressions do not reject the null hypothesis
that the instruments are valid,25 The overidentification test results are thus consistent with our
claim of a causal relationship from population concentration to governance indicators.
[TABLE 8B HERE]
Cases of capital city relocation We move on to discuss a particular form of endogenous
population concentration: endogenous location of the capital city. Most of the time, capital
city locations are grounded in historical contexts that far precede our period of interest. Since
1960, there have been only nine cases of capital city relocation (detailed in the Appendix),
many of them are purposed to isolate the seat of the government from the large population
and, albeit various officially proclaimed reasons, are commonly motivated by the anti-riot con-
cern in the quote of Brazil’s President Kubitschek cited at the beginning of section 2. For
instance, Myanmar’s newly built capital Naypyidaw was described by the journalist Siddharth
Varadarajan as “the ultimate insurance against regime change, a masterpiece of urban plan-
ning designed to defeat any putative colour revolution not by tanks and water cannons, but
25That is, the instruments are not correlated with the errors, and the excluded instruments are correctly
excluded from the estimate equation. Due to a technical issue of non-full rank covariance matrices of moment
conditions, we have to exclude the legal origin dummies in order to calculate the Hansen J stat: the results are
essentially the same whether legal origin dummies are included or not.
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by geometry and cartography.” (Himal Southasian, February 2007)26 All cases have happened
under non-democratic regimes; most of the time the capital city is moved to a small city where
population concentration abruptly diminishes, and as predicted, governance quality is also re-
duced. Only Tanzania’s move (1996) of the capital from Dar-es-Salam to Dodoma seems to be
an exception, as Tanzania’s five governance measures have been on the rise since the late 1990’s
while Dodoma is a much smaller city compared to the old capital. This exception nevertheless
confirms the norm: in fact, even if Dodoma is a smaller city, it is situated in the middle of
the highly populated region in northern Tanzania, so that the relocation has increased and
not decreased our measure PCI1 for Tanzania, consistent with the improvement of governance
afterwards. Finally, these particular cases do not drive our results: Table 9 replicates the OLS
regressions in Table 4 without the countries that have relocated their capital cities, producing
similar, if not slightly stronger, results for all governance indicators.
[TABLE 9 HERE]
3.4 Inequality, Redistribution and Population Concentration
While our direct predictions concern the impact of population concentration on redistribution in
non-democratic countries, the rarety of good redistribution data leads us to focus on an indirect
testable prediction: in non-democratic countries, a more concentrated population (around the
capital city) implies a larger difference between pre-tax inequality and post-tax inequality.
The analysis of redistribution and inequality is undertaken with the most up-to-date and
complete inequality dataset, the World Income Inequality Database (WIID) version 2.0 assem-
bled by the World Institute of Development Economic Research (WIDER). This is a radically
revised and updated version of the WIID 1.0, which built on Deininger and Squire’s (1996)
dataset. Inequality datasets are usually criticized for their lack of consistency both across and
within countries (Banerjee and Duflo 2003, Atkinson and Brandolini 2001). The new version
of the WIID goes a long way in addressing much of that criticism by carefully considering the
characteristics of the surveys leading to each observation, and classifying them under several
categories. Notably, it is made clear whether each survey conveys information on income or
expenditure, what form of income or expenditure is concerned, and whether the concepts and
26The history of changes in the location of capital cities, considered at some length in Campante and Do
(2007), is proof that this problem is very often explicitly considered.
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methodologies of the survey are clear and reasonably correct.
We limit ourselves to the observations of good quality: those attaining at least quality 2
(either the income concept or the survey is verifiable) on a scale from 1 (most reliable) to
4 (not unlike the use of ‘acceptable/reliable quality” data from earlier datasets WIID 1 or
Deininger-Squire). More importantly, unlike its predecessors, WIID 2.0 enables us to keep
track of different kinds of sources, that we aggregate into three categories: Gross income, Net
income, and Consumption (see the Data Appendix for more details). This is in line with the
recommendation of Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) in their critique of the Deininger-Squire
dataset. We then contract the dataset to represent only one observation for each country, year
and type of data. As suggested by Deininger and Squire (1996) and reconfirmed by Atkinson
and Brandolini (2001), we include a dummy variable for consumption-based inequality data, as
well as one for gross-income inequality, in all regressions.
Even with the WIID 2.0, the scarcity of good inequality data for non-democratic countries
still poses a problem. We are thus led to use all years after 1990 in the benchmark case of
explaining net-income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) in non-democratic coun-
tries by population size and concentration, controlling for lag of log GDP per capita, polity
and ethno-linguistic fractionalization, using regional and legal origin fixed effects, presented in
column 1 in Table 11:
[TABLE 11 HERE]
The predicted pattern emerges strongly: in non-democratic countries, net-income inequality
after 1990 is negatively predicted by concentration and size of the population in 1990. The
following columns 2-4 check the cases when each of the main characters of column 1’s sample is
reversed. Column 2 shows the case of pre-1990 inequality, column 3 the sample of democratic
countries, and column 4 gross-income inequality. Population concentration is significant in
none of the three columns, its coefficient size largely reduced compared to column 1. Columns
5 and 6 show similar results for a simpler measure of inequality, the ratio between the richest
and the poorest quintiles, for net- and gross-income distributions after 1990 in non-democratic
countries. This measure exhibits the relative positions of the very rich and the very poor, thus
hinting that redistribution at least touches the poor, a theme we will explore in greater depth
later.
20
Columns 7 to 9 investigate the same relationship, using the alternative measures of popula-
tion concentration, and once again uncover the same storyline: Inv Avg Dist does measure the
concept of concentration around a certain point, but with lots of noise, resulting in an insignifi-
cant coefficient that is attenuated towards zero (the calculated beta coefficient for Inv Avg Dist
is −0.26, compared to −0.87 for PCI1), while capital city primacy is even more unstable (beta
coefficient of only −0.06), and the location Gini distinctly stands for a very different concept.
We treat the potential endogeneity problem in column 10, instrumenting for population
concentration using log of population density. In presence of a control variable of log of popu-
lation size, this is equivalent to an instrumental variable of log of land area, the power of which
was already demonstrated.27 The result reassuringly confirms our theory. Together with the
argument of persistence in our measure of population concentration, we confidently discard the
worry of its endogeneity.
Our theory emphasizes on the role of the poor, a factor unobservable on population map
data. We proceed to test an indirect prediction: population concentration should have a
stronger effect on the welfare of the poorest, compared to the middle class. Table 12 breaks
down the relationship between inequality and population concentration into four regressions of
the inequality between each quintile and the richest quintile.
[TABLE 12]
The results are sharp: population concentration matters significantly, in both statistical and
economic senses, to the poorest quintile, while having indistinct influences on the middle class
(quintiles 2-4). Once again, the empirical evidence endorses our theory that population con-
centration affects constructive policies primarily affecting the poor.
4 Concluding Remarks
We have so far presented a simple, unified political economy framework capable of generating
the positive impact of population concentration on several indicators of governance and redistri-
bution, as consistently shown in the data. Yet there may still exist alternative explanations that
generate the same causal link we have found, without recourse to a political economy account
27Since we use all years since 1990, instead of a single year as in the previous section, it is hard to conceive a
well-suited IV for the value of PCI1 in 1990. An attempt of using lags of life expectancy and population growth
as in the previous section provides similar qualitative results, available upon request.
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of insurgency threat. For instance, one could imagine that the existence of some fixed cost of
instituting good governance and a system of redistribution that is specific to the capital city,
which would reproduce the relationship we have found in the data. First, while this explanation
may be natural for a system of taxation, it is more contrived with respect to governance aspects
such as voice and accountability or the rule of law, salient outcome variables in our empirical
results. Furthermore, it is far from clear how such an explanation would generate a different
behavior in democracies and non-democracies: Why would such fixed costs be present in the
latter, but not in the former? Finally, there is nothing in it that explains why the resulting
redistribution weighs more on the poorest quintile, as found in the data. Other explanations
based on transport cost or heterogeneity of skills also fail to project a consistent empirical
picture, if not for very peculiar assumptions. The refutation of some of the most natural al-
ternative explanations increases our confidence that the mechanism we propose is important in
accounting for the role of population concentration.
Our findings lead to a number of policy implications. First, we now understand that in-
frastructure improvements and liberalization of harsh anti-migration policies in nondemocratic
regimes have additional impacts on governance and on the poor, on top of the direct impacts
on welfare and development that have been widely discussed in the literature. It remains to be
seen whether this indirect effect of concentration is comparable to the negative effect of urban
congestion, coupled with bad urban planning in developing countries. Second, our results point
to the difficulty of governance improvement in nondemocratic countries with low population
concentration (e.g. the Democratic Republic of the Congo), and of the extent of problems of
dictatorships moving the capital city away from densely populated zones (e.g. Myanmar in
2005): our theory predicts deteriorating economic and political environments in both cases.
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A Appendix: Data Description
A.1 Standard Data
Population Concentration Index: The measures PCI1 and PCI2 are calculated and nor-
malized as explained in the text, using original gridded population maps from the database
Gridded Population of the World (GPW), Version 3 from the Socio-Economic Data Cen-
ter, Columbia University (2005), containing maps in 1990, 1995 and 2000 of a global grid
of 2.5 arc-minute side cells (approximately 5km).
Alternative Indices of Concentration: The alternative indices of concentration are also
produced from the same dataset as our PCI1 and PCI2. The location Gini (noted in the
Tables as “Gini Pop”) is calculated as the Gini coefficient of inequality of a special sample,
in which each “individual” corresponds to a gridded cell on the map, and each individual’s
“income” corresponds to the size of the population living within that cell. Inv Avg Dist
is calculated as 1 divided by the population-weighted average of distance from each cell
to the capital city. Neg Avg Dist is the opposite of the population-weighted average of
distance from each cell to the capital city. “Cap Prim” (Capital city primacy) is calculated
as the share of the capital city population over the total population. “Share Largest Point”
and “Share Largest Urban Extent” are calculated as the ratio of respectively the largest
settlement point and the largest urban extent over the total population. These population
figures come directly from the SEDC.
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (KKM): From KKM’s (2006) indices, including Voice
and Accountability, Control of Corruption, Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness, Polit-
ical Stability, and Regulation Quality, themselves a composite of different agency ratings
aggregated by an unobserved components methodology. On a scale of −2.5 to 2.5. Data
are available for 1996-2002 at two-year intervals, and thereafter for 2002-2005 on an annual
basis. We use the data in 1996 for our measure of population concentration in 1990. KKM
data available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2005/pdf/2005kkdata.xls
Inequality Data are from the World Institute of Development Economic Research’s (2005)
“World Income Inequality Database v.2.0a”, available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm.
This is a radically revised version of the WIID 1.0, built on Deininger and Squire’s (1996)
dataset. We limit ourselves to the observations of good quality: those attaining at least
quality 2 (either the income concept or the survey is verifiable) on a scale from 1 (most
reliable) to 4. The sources of income are classified from the income definitions (labeled
“incdefn”) as follows: “Consumption” includes incdefn = “Consumption”, “Consump-
tion/Expenditure” and “Expenditure”; “Gross” includes incdefn = “Earnings, Gross”,
“Income, Factor”, “Income, Gross”, “Income, Taxable”, “Market Income”, and “Mone-
tary Income, Gross”; “Net” includes incdefn = “Earnings, Net”, “Income, Disposable”,
and “Monetary Income, Disposable”.
Real GDP per capita: From the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). Real
PPP-adjusted GDP per capita (in constant 2000 international dollars).
Population by year: From the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI).
Democracy: Polity IV democracy score, on a scale of 0 to 10.
Autocracy: Polity IV autocracy score, on a scale of 0 to 10.
Polity: Polity IV composite score as Democracy minus Autocracy, on a scale of -10 to 10.
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The reference date for the annual observations in the Polity IV dataset is 31 December of
each year. We match these to the data corresponding to 1 January of the following year for
consistency with the DPI. Data available at: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization: From Alesina et al. (2003).
Fuel exports: From the WDI. Value of fuel exports as a percentage of total merchandize
exports.
Ore exports: From the WDI. Value of ore and metal exports as a percentage of total mer-
chandize exports.
Openness: From the WDI. Openness measure equals the sum of imports and exports as a
share of GDP.
Government Expenditure: From the WDI. Total government consumption expenditure as
a share of GDP.
Legal Origin: From La Porta et al. (1999). Dummy variables for British, French, Scandina-
vian, German, and socialist legal origin.
Region dummies: Following the World Bank’s classifications, dummy variables for: East
Asia and the Pacific; East Europe and Central Asia; Middle East and North America;
South Asia; West Europe; North America; Sub-Saharan Africa; Latin America and the
Caribbean.
A.2 Movement of Capital Cities:
The nine cases of an actual movement of the capital city since 1960 are the following:
• Belize, 1961, from Belize City to Belmopan, after a horrendous hurricane had destroyed
most of Belize City.
• Brazil, 1960, from Rio de Janeiro to Bras´ılia, a city constructed from scratches. The move
had been cited for reasons dating back to the Brazilian independence in the nineteenth
century, yet many scholars argued the deep reason had to do with the willingness to
isolate the government from the large populations in Sa˜o Paolo and Rio de Janeiro.
Shortly afterwards, the 1964 coup d’e´tat established a military dictatorship that lasted
until 1985.
• Coˆte d’Ivoire, 1983, from Abidjan to Yamoussoukro, a small town in the middle of the
country renown only for the largest basilica in the world. Abidjan still remains important
in the economic and political life of the country. Governance indicators of Coˆte d’Ivoire
have been on the sharp decline in the available sample of KKM data.
• Kazakhstan, 1997, from Almaty to Astana. Governance quality (KKM indicators) some-
what deteriorated during the following decade, except for political stability.
• Malawi, 1974, from Zomba (near Blantyre) to Lilongwe.
• Nigeria, 1991, from Lagos to Abuja.
• Myanmar, 2005, from Yangon to Naypyidaw in the province of Pyinmana, a rural location
hitherto scarcely inhabited. We know from KKM that the military rule in Myanmar has
been worsening during the last decade, although the number for 2006 is still unavailable.
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• Pakistan, 1960, from Karachi to Islamabad, a newly constructed city. While our calcu-
lation shows that Pakistan is now more concentrated around Islamabad than Karachi,
we are reluctant to draw the same conclusion for the case of 1960. The location that
maximizes concentration in Pakistan is still not Islamabad, but Faisalabad in Pakistani
Punjab.
• Tanzania, 1996, from Dar Es Salam to Dodoma. The new capital city is situated in the
middle of a very populated region in the North of Tanzania, thus PCI has increased even
if Dodoma itself is much smaller than Dar Es Salam. This move accompanies a process
of democratization in Tanzania, along which governance has improved substantially.
We do not treat the selection of Berlin as the capital city of the unified Germany in 1990 as a
movement of capital city, nor do we consider the unifications of Vietnam in 1976 or Yemen in
1990. While historical evidence suggests that the general level of governance deteriorates after
unification, which is concordant with our theory, we suspect it does for very different reasons.
B An Illustrative Model of Geographical Political Influ-
ence
In this section we construct a simple illustrative model of political influence with iceberg trans-
port cost to derive comparative statics relating population concentration around the capital
city and dictatorial government’s responses.
Let us first focus on the case of non-democracies where elections are ineffective, if not
dismissed, and the populace must rely on non-institutional measures such as uprisings and
revolutions to echo their political voices. Assume a geographical distribution µ of the population
on a map, with the capital city C. For each location x, denote its distance from the capital
city dx, and its representative agent Ax. Each agent has an endowment of Tx (time, manpower
etc.) which he chooses to spend on two substitutable activities: the production of ordinary
goods Cx and the contribution Sx to political threats via non-institutional channels such as
protests, uprisings and revolutions. For simplicity, we abstract from the issues of political
uncertainty, and assume straightaway that the latter activity results in a certain outcome pSx
for the agent, which depends on how involved he is in the revolution (Sx), and how “profitable”
the revolution could be (p). Here p exhibits the rate of return to the agent’s contribution, and
will be determined by the “production” of the aggregate political threat. More specifically,
we expect a higher p when there is more inequality, as there would be a larger scope for
redistribution both during and after revolutions.28
We choose to remain general by assuming only that the agent’s final utility function has a
Constant Elasticity of Substitution form for these two factors, namely that:
Ux =
[
(pSx)
ζ−1
ζ + C
ζ−1
ζ
x
] ζ
ζ−1
,
with the assumption that the (constant) elasticity of substitution ζ ∈ [1,∞), so that the two
factors are imperfect substitutes.
We assume simple linear production functions of both Cx and Sx, with respective unit costs
cc and cs,x, i.e. the budget constraint is written as ccCx + cs,xSx = Tx. The common cost of
28The idea that the occurrence of revolutions must rely on private gains dates back to Tullock (1971), and
is seen as the common solution for the public good problem of revolutions. Elsewhere in Campante & Do
(2007), and following Acemoglu & Robinson (2000, 2005), we discuss that the prospect of redistribution is a
key motivation for revolutions in non-democracies.
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productive economic activities c¯c represents the aggregate level of productivity in the country
that also incorporates the impact of good governance and state capture, variables that are
observable and adjustable by the dictatorship. While the normal economic activities do not
depend on distance to the capital city, subversive activities need to be initiated and coordinated
at the political capital to be effective, implying that the corresponding costs depend on the
relative location of each individual with respect to the capital city. This feature draws the
sharp line between non-democracies and democracies, since in the latter regimes the low cost of
participating in elections rules out non-institutional channels such as protests and revolutions
(as discussed at length in Acemoglu & Robinson (2005)). While in fair elections all citizens have
equal importance no matter where they live, individuals deciding to join a revolution initiated
at the capital city face an important geographical constraint, if they do not live nearby. In that
spirit, we model the individual cost of subversive activities due to distance, cs,x, as a standard
iceberg transport cost (as proposed by Paul Samuelson (1954) and used universally in trade
and economic geography), making the actual costs of subversive activities a factor higher than
the original costs in the capital city:
cs,x = c¯stx, tx = t¯ · dist(x,C)γ = t¯dγx, γ > 0.
The common cost of subversion c¯s represents the possibility and difficulty of subversive activ-
ities, which the dictatorship could also influence. Similarly to the trade literature on gravity
equations, the transport cost is assumed to have a polynomial functional form in terms of
distance, while the factor t¯ exhibits transportation technologies.
The optimization program for agent Ax is simply that of a CES utility function, with the
following solution for Sx:
cs,xSx = Tx
(cs,x/p)
1−ζ
(cs,x/p)1−ζ + c
1−ζ
c
= Tx
c¯1−ζs
c¯1−ζs + (pcc)1−ζ t¯ζ−1d
γ(ζ−1)
x
def≡ Txw−1
⇒ Sx = Txw−1c¯−1s d−γx .
Here w represents the relative attractiveness of productive activities compared to subversive
activities. When ζ > 1, an increase of the cost of productive activities cc would lead to a decrease
in w, as resources shifts towards Sx. The opposite happens when the cost of subversive activities
c¯s increases. Similarly, w decreases when the return to subversive activities p increases. Most
importantly for our purpose, when an individual lives farther from the capital city, i.e. when
dx is higher, he is less into subversion, and this due to two effects: the direct cost of subversive
activities is higher, and it is
Now assume that the individual contributions combine into an aggregate political threat R
by a CES production technology, which could become effective once reaching a certain critical
level R¯, as discussed in Campante & Do (2007):
R =
[∫
S
σ−1
σ
x dµ(x)
] σ
σ−1
. (1)
It follows immediately that when population concentration is higher, the dictatorial govern-
ment takes more preemptive measures. Those include not only repressive measures that either
increase the direct cost c¯s, but also constructive measures that improves economic conditions
expressed in c¯c, or redistributive policies that lowers p. Alternatively, the government could
also try to affect the distribution of dx by limiting immigration to the capital city, moving parts
of the population even farther away, or relocating the capital city. Provided that the cost of
these measures add up to the government’s capacity constraint, in equilibrium all measures will
be taken, and more of each of them all the more population concentration increases.
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From this simple model, we could derive the following predictions with respect to popula-
tion concentration around the capital city: among non-democratic countries, high population
concentration is associated with better policies in governance improvement, more redistribution
to the poor, more efforts in controlling the population by force, and possibly more attempts to
relocate the capital city.
The model also lends naturally to aggregate measures of population concentration based
on individual impacts on the capital city, which could be expressed by an impact function of
distance to the capital city:
h(d) = d−γ
σ−1
σ , σ ≥ 1.
This functional form is similar to the Centered Index of Spatial Concentration developed in Do
& Campante (2008): I =
∫
population
h(distance(x,C))dµ(x).
31
Figure 1  
Rule of Law in Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes 
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Figure 3 
Histograms of PCI1 (1990) and Inverse Average Distance (1990) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4  
KKM’s Control of Corruption (2000) and PCI1 (1990) 
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Table 1
Cross Country Summary Statistics
Variable Observations Mean
Standard 
Deviation Min Max
PCI 1 90 156 0.46393 0.09706 0.24554 0.76407
PCI 1 95 156 0.46439 0.09710 0.24391 0.76411
PCI 1 00 156 0.46480 0.09715 0.24177 0.76414
PCI 2 90 156 0.25271 0.07365 0.10474 0.58199
PCI 2 95 156 0.25337 0.07364 0.10036 0.58199
PCI 2 00 156 0.25397 0.07368 0.09725 0.58199
Inv Avg Dist 90 156 0.00730 0.00943 0.00067 0.09799
Inv Avg Dist 95 156 0.00732 0.00944 0.00067 0.09802
Inv Avg Dist 00 156 0.00735 0.00945 0.00066 0.09805
Gini Pop 90 156 0.64962 0.15875 0.13878 0.98692
Gini Pop 95 156 0.65147 0.15796 0.12438 0.98718
Gini Pop 00 156 0.65380 0.15695 0.10970 0.98766
Cap Prim 90 110 0.12257 0.12683 0.00165 1.03369
Cap Prim 95 156 0.11741 0.11818 0.00114 1.10165
Cap Prim 00 156 0.12098 0.11531 0.00106 1.02410
Growth PCI 1 90-95 156 0.099% 0.608% -3.091% 2.171%
Growth PCI 1 95-00 156 0.089% 0.526% -1.680% 2.206%
Growth GiniPop 90-95 156 0.326% 2.312% -11.579% 20.872%
Growth GiniPop 95-00 156 0.390% 2.222% -13.376% 18.889%
Growth Inv Avg Dist 90-95 156 0.240% 1.386% -6.939% 7.480%
Growth Inv Avg Dist 95-00 156 0.212% 1.211% -3.359% 7.875%
Growth Cap Prim 90-95 110 1.769% 5.933% -14.898% 17.897%
Growth Cap Prim 95-00 156 4.085% 6.687% -20.589% 31.523%
PCI1 and PCI2 are our index of population concentration, calculated and normalizedas explained in the text. Inv Avg
Dist is the reciprocal of the population-weightedaverage distance to the capital city. Gini Pop is the location Gini
calculated from the distribution of gridded cells as explained in the text. Cap Prim is the share of population in the
capital city. "Growth" variables are growth rates over periods of 5 years of the corresponding variables. More details 
available in the Data Description Appendix.
Table 2
Cross Country Correlation
PCI1 90 PCI1 95 PCI1 00 PCI2 90 PCI2 95 PCI2 00
Inv Avg 
Dist 90
Inv Avg 
Dist 95
Inv Avg 
Dist 00
Gini Pop 
90
Gini Pop 
95
Gini Pop 
00
Cap Prim 
90
Cap Prim 
95
PCI 1 90 1
PCI 1 95 0.9997 1
PCI 1 00 0.999 0.9997 1
PCI 2 90 0.6326 0.6314 0.6298 1
PCI 2 95 0.6352 0.6351 0.6346 0.9988 1
PCI 2 00 0.636 0.6369 0.6375 0.9953 0.9988 1
Inv Avg Dist 90 0.7125 0.7115 0.7103 0.3919 0.3919 0.3907 1
Inv Avg Dist 95 0.7138 0.7131 0.712 0.3913 0.3917 0.3911 0.9999 1
Inv Avg Dist 00 0.715 0.7144 0.7136 0.3905 0.3915 0.3914 0.9996 0.9999 1
Gini Pop 90 -0.2678 -0.2718 -0.2754 0.3652 0.3555 0.3455 -0.2167 -0.2194 -0.2224 1
Gini Pop 95 -0.2699 -0.2732 -0.276 0.3662 0.3581 0.3499 -0.2205 -0.2227 -0.2252 0.9987 1
Gini Pop 00 -0.2708 -0.2733 -0.2753 0.3663 0.3601 0.3537 -0.224 -0.2256 -0.2275 0.9942 0.9984 1
Cap Prim 90 0.4807 0.4792 0.4775 0.3814 0.3787 0.3749 0.6445 0.6429 0.6408 -0.073 -0.0748 -0.0773 1
Cap Prim 95 0.4751 0.4739 0.4724 0.3733 0.371 0.3677 0.6631 0.6615 0.6595 -0.0807 -0.0825 -0.0848 0.9979 1
Cap Prim 00 0.4746 0.4736 0.4724 0.3855 0.3837 0.3809 0.6389 0.6374 0.6354 -0.0754 -0.0765 -0.0782 0.9961 0.9979
PCI1 and PCI2 are our index of population concentration, calculated and normalized as explained in the text. Inv Avg Dist is the reciprocal of the
population-weighted average distance to the capital city. Gini Pop is the location Gini calculated from the distribution of gridded cells as explained
in the text. Cap Prim is the share of population in the capital city. More details are available in the Data Description Appendix.
Table 3
Ranking by PCI1 90
Code Country PCI 1 90
Rank 
PCI 1 90 PCI 2 90
Rank 
PCI 2 90
Inverse Average 
Distance 90
Rank Inv
Avg Dist 90
Gini 
Pop 90
Rank 
Gini Pop 90
Cap Prim 
90
Rank 
Cap Prim 90
USA United States 0.246 1 0.246 74 0.00067 1 0.914 149 0.002 4
BRA Brazil 0.247 2 0.147 12 0.00093 6 0.852 140 0.012 12
CHN China 0.251 3 0.169 21 0.00090 4 0.751 113 0.008 9
ZAF(b) South Africa (Cape Town) 0.263 4 0.105 1 0.00091 5 0.923 150 0.052 45
RUS Russia 0.269 5 0.250 77 0.00069 2 0.930 153 0.064 52
IND India 0.270 6 0.171 22 0.00101 7 0.540 39 0.010 10
MOZ Mozambique 0.290 7 0.145 11 0.00103 8 0.661 88 0.052 47
KAZ Kazakhstan 0.298 8 0.149 14 0.00133 11 0.750 112 0.019 18
ZAR Congo Kinshasa (DR) 0.298 9 0.156 15 0.00104 9 0.606 58 0.082 73
CAN Canada 0.301 10 0.244 72 0.00087 3 0.987 156 0.026 25
PRI Puerto Rico 0.622 147 0.354 146 0.02124 150 0.493 21 0.106 91
SLV El Salvador 0.628 148 0.345 142 0.02047 148 0.531 37 0.079 69
CRI Costa Rica 0.631 149 0.392 152 0.01834 145 0.654 86 0.075 62
ARM Armenia 0.645 150 0.404 154 0.02152 151 0.564 50 0.332 153
TTO Trinidad and Tobago 0.648 151 0.346 144 0.02940 154 0.614 62 0.037 31
LBN Lebanon 0.648 152 0.328 137 0.02443 152 0.596 56 0.326 151
JOR Jordan 0.652 153 0.450 155 0.02116 149 0.884 147 0.241 141
KWT Kuwait 0.665 154 0.384 149 0.03021 155 0.732 104 0.017 15
MUS Mauritius 0.704 155 0.582 156 0.02841 153 0.627 70 0.108 93
SGP Singapore 0.764 156 0.353 145 0.09799 156 0.516 28 1.102 156
PCI1 and PCI2 are our index of population concentration, calculated and normalized as explained in the text. Inv Avg Dist is the reciprocal of the population-weighted
average distance to the capital city. Gini Pop is the location Gini calculated from the distribution of gridded cells as explained in the text. Cap Prim is the share of
population in the capital city. More details are available in the Data Description Appendix.
Table 4: Governance and PCI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control for 
Corruption
Voice & 
Accountability Rule of Law
Regulation 
Quality
Government 
Effectiveness Political Stability
A. Democratic Countries
PCI1 90 -0.759 0.017 -0.135 0.0861 0.209 -0.573
[0.76] [0.47] [0.56] [0.59] [0.61] [0.77]
Log GDP per capita 0.600*** 0.372*** 0.570*** 0.482*** 0.622*** 0.288***
[0.10] [0.060] [0.087] [0.094] [0.085] [0.10]
Log Population -0.144** -0.0827*** -0.125*** -0.0835* -0.0599 -0.242***
[0.055] [0.030] [0.045] [0.042] [0.045] [0.058]
Polity score 0.0949** 0.151*** 0.0931*** 0.0863** 0.0815** 0.136***
[0.037] [0.029] [0.030] [0.040] [0.034] [0.038]
Ethno-Ling. Fractionalization -0.275 -0.116 -0.153 0.121 0.0943 -0.805***
[0.27] [0.17] [0.23] [0.24] [0.24] [0.30]
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Legal Origin Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 573 575 575 575 575 575
R-squared 0.85 0.8 0.87 0.73 0.87 0.68
B. Non-Democratic Countries
PCI1 90 2.483*** 1.452*** 1.735*** 2.377*** 2.152*** -1.128
[0.60] [0.52] [0.54] [0.88] [0.75] [0.90]
Beta coefficients 0.347*** 0.272*** 0.241*** 0.318*** 0.295*** -0.136
Log GDP per capita 0.440*** 0.0983 0.324*** 0.345*** 0.380*** 0.389***
[0.076] [0.072] [0.083] [0.11] [0.090] [0.13]
Log Population 0.0243 0.0029 0.00135 0.0412 0.0726 -0.177***
[0.049] [0.039] [0.057] [0.078] [0.061] [0.063]
Polity score -0.000367 0.0617*** 0.00919 0.0257* 0.0119 0.0134
[0.0084] [0.010] [0.0094] [0.015] [0.011] [0.016]
Ethno-Ling. Fractionalization -0.167 0.28 -0.22 0.123 -0.0679 -0.107
[0.19] [0.21] [0.20] [0.39] [0.31] [0.33]
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Legal Origin Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 351 355 355 355 355 355
R-squared 0.73 0.54 0.74 0.54 0.67 0.43
Intercept omitted. Country-level clustered robust standard errors in brackets. Panel A consists of countries with polity score larger than 5, Panel B
consists of countries with polity score les than or equal to 5. Dependent variables are from Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi's (2006) governance
indices. GDP per capita and population are from the World Development Index database. PCI is the population concentration index from our
calculation. Independent variables are taken with lag. The beta coefficients display how much of a standard deviation of the dependent variable
results from a change of a standard deviation in PCI. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Additional Prediction on Political Stability and PCI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Political 
Stability
Political 
Stability
Average 
Executive 
Tenure (Log)
Average Party 
Tenure (Log)
Political 
Stability
Political 
Stability
Average 
Executive 
Tenure (Log)
Average Party 
Tenure (Log)
A. Democratic Countries B. Non-democratic Countries
PCI1 90 -0.589 -0.707 0.447 -0.528 -2.522*** -3.350*** -2.099** -1.7
[0.55] [0.47] [0.75] [0.80] [0.79] [0.72] [1.04] [1.13]
Beta coefficients -0.303*** -0.404*** -0.324** -0.237
Log GDP per capita -0.0637 -0.219*** -0.240** -0.054 0.294*** 0.0471 0.00925 -0.1
[0.083] [0.070] [0.11] [0.12] [0.10] [0.10] [0.14] [0.16]
Log Population -0.164*** -0.141*** -0.00698 -0.0241 -0.180*** -0.186*** -0.0835 -0.0153
[0.047] [0.038] [0.063] [0.056] [0.049] [0.042] [0.060] [0.066]
Polity score -0.0062 -0.000131 -0.0524 -0.0313 -0.0459*** -0.0245* -0.014 -0.0136
[0.029] [0.023] [0.049] [0.044] [0.014] [0.012] [0.015] [0.016]
Ethno-Ling. Fractionalization -0.696*** -0.705*** -0.503 -0.489 -0.376 -0.052 0.31 0.254
[0.24] [0.20] [0.37] [0.46] [0.26] [0.24] [0.40] [0.41]
Voice and Accountability 0.944*** 0.584*** 0.0129 -0.0625 0.960*** 0.577*** -0.121 -0.166
[0.11] [0.15] [0.16] [0.17] [0.14] [0.14] [0.16] [0.17]
Other governance variables YES YES YES YES YES YES
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Legal Origin Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 575 573 573 573 355 351 351 351
R-squared 0.79 0.82 0.31 0.33 0.61 0.7 0.39 0.51
Intercept omitted. Country-level clustered robust standard errors in brackets. Panel A consists of countries with polity score larger than 5, Panel B consists
of countries with polity score les than or equal to 5. Dependent variables are from Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi's (2006) governance indices. GDP per
capita and population are from the World Development Index database. PCI is the population concentration index from our calculation. Independent
variables are taken with lag. The beta coefficients display how much of a standard deviation of the dependent variable results from a change of a standard
deviation in PCI. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Military spending and population concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Arms imports (Log) Military expenditure share of budget Arms imports (Log)
Military expenditure 
share of budget
A. Democratic Countries B. Non-Democratic Countries
PCI1 90 -0.163 -0.807 8.425*** 2.776***
[2.31] [1.09] [1.17] [0.88]
Log GDP per capita 0.683** 0.418*** 0.528* 0.0325
[0.27] [0.13] [0.27] [0.16]
Log Population 0.674*** 0.207** 1.202*** -0.0649
[0.15] [0.080] [0.12] [0.082]
Polity score -0.138 -0.183*** -0.0118 -0.016
[0.11] [0.057] [0.036] [0.016]
Ethno-Ling. Fractionalization 0.105 0.136 0.427 1.388***
[0.72] [0.30] [0.51] [0.39]
Fuel -0.00547 -0.002 0.0155*** 0.00876***
[0.0049] [0.0028] [0.0047] [0.0031]
Ores 0.0237** 0.0166*** 0.0147* 0.00443
[0.0097] [0.0058] [0.0083] [0.0034]
Legal Origin Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Observations 194 158 511 433
R-squared 0.66 0.65 0.5 0.69
Intercept omitted. Country-level clustered robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at country level. Military spending
share of central government budget, arms imports, GDP per capita, population size, fuel and ores exports are from the World
Development Index database. Polity score is from the Polity IV database. Ethno-linguistic fractionalization is from Alesina et
al. (2003). PCI is the population concentration index from our calculation. Independent variables are taken with lag. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: Robust Results with Rule of Law
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent Variable: Rule of Law
PCI1 90 2.979** 3.039** 1.735*** 1.512* 2.644** 2.136** 2.774*** 4.241*** 3.086*** 2.831*** 3.476*** 2.976***
[1.32] [1.39] [0.54] [0.85] [1.00] [0.84] [0.83] [0.81] [0.69] [0.95] [1.26] [0.90]
Log GDP per capita 0.324*** 0.407*** 0.538*** 0.435*** 0.496*** 0.419*** 0.454*** 0.490*** 0.497*** 0.477***
[0.083] [0.093] [0.10] [0.085] [0.079] [0.091] [0.079] [0.083] [0.086] [0.11]
Log Population 0.00135 -0.0165 0.0901 0.0734 0.0899 0.194*** 0.143** 0.115* 0.107* 0.111*
[0.057] [0.066] [0.070] [0.057] [0.058] [0.064] [0.056] [0.060] [0.059] [0.058]
Polity score 0.00919 0.00478 -0.0133 -0.00348 -0.00525 0.00571 0.00446 0.00436 -0.00303 -0.00297
[0.0094] [0.016] [0.014] [0.011] [0.011] [0.013] [0.011] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011]
Ethno-Ling. Fractionalization -0.22 -0.727** 0.343 0.273 0.503* 0.607** 0.649** 0.439* 0.432* 0.443*
[0.20] [0.29] [0.24] [0.23] [0.26] [0.28] [0.31] [0.24] [0.25] [0.25]
Legal Origin Fixed Effect YES YES
Regional Fixed Effects YES YES
Fuel exports -0.00328*
[0.0018]
Ores and metal exports 0.00102
[0.0051]
Openness 0.0000923
[0.0019]
Presidential system -0.248
[0.16]
Plurality rule 0.139
[0.15]
Majority of government 0.888***
[0.29]
Government fractionalization 0.282
[0.21]
Opposition fractionalization 0.284**
[0.13]
Government Expenditure 0.0140**
[0.0060]
PCI Uniform -0.573
[1.37]
Largest Share Urban Ext. 0.00129
[0.0033]
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 437 64 355 54 253 336 359 281 237 345 362 362
R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.74 0.76 0.57 0.42 0.56 0.6 0.66 0.56 0.55 0.55
Intercept omitted. Country-level clustered robust standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable is Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi's (2006) rule of law indicator. GDP per capita, population, fuel and ore
exports, openness, government expenditure are from the World Development Index database. PCI, PCI if uniform distribution, urbanization are from our own calculation from the Gridded Population of the
World dataset. Plurality rule, presidential system, majority of government, government and opposition fractionalization are from the Database of Political Institutions. Independent variables are taken with lag.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8A: Land Area as IV for Population Concentration
First Stage Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Instrumented Variables PCI1 90
Dependent
 Variables
Control for 
Corruption
Voice & 
Accountability Rule of Law
Regulation 
Quality
Government 
Effectiveness
Political 
Stability
Political 
Stability
Log Land Area -0.0499***
[0.0043]
PCI1 90 2.484*** 0.783 1.465* 2.009* 1.8 -0.994 -2.507**
[0.85] [0.73] [0.78] [1.05] [1.15] [1.34] [0.97]
Log Population -0.00332 Log Population 0.0254 -0.0285 -0.015 0.0244 0.0509 -0.166** -0.141***
[0.0053] [0.059] [0.047] [0.066] [0.089] [0.079] [0.083] [0.049]
Log GDP per capita -0.0015 Log GDP per capita 0.462*** 0.107 0.332*** 0.334*** 0.382*** 0.397*** 0.0558
[0.010] [0.078] [0.072] [0.084] [0.11] [0.092] [0.13] [0.11]
Polity score 0.00292*** Polity score -0.00165 0.0629*** 0.00933 0.0285** 0.0125 0.00678 -0.0312**
[0.0011] [0.0085] [0.0097] [0.0088] [0.014] [0.011] [0.015] [0.012]
Ethno-Ling. Fractionalization -0.0115 Ethno-Ling. Fractionalization -0.181 0.188 -0.234 0.119 -0.092 -0.053 0.065
[0.035] [0.21] [0.22] [0.21] [0.40] [0.33] [0.35] [0.26]
Governance Indicators YES
Year Fixed Effect YES Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Regional Fixed Effect YES Regional Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Legal Origin Fixed Effect YES Legal Origin Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
F-stat 91.85
Observations 306 306 310 310 310 310 310 306
R-squared 0.85 0.72 0.51 0.74 0.54 0.66 0.42 0.69
Intercepts omitted. Country-level clustered robust standard errors in brackets. All first stage F-stats are larger than 10. Sample comprises of non-democratic countries (lag polity measure less than 5).
Dependent variables are from Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi's (2006) governance indices. GDP per capita and population are from the World Development Index database. PCI is the population
concentration index from our calculation. Independent variables are taken with lag. The beta coefficients display how much of a standard deviation of the dependent variable results from a change of a
standard deviation in PCI. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8B: IVs for Population Concentration and Population Size
First Stage Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Instrumented Variables PCI1 90
Log 
Pop 90
Dependent
 Variables
Control for 
Corruption
Voice & 
Accountability Rule of Law
Regulation 
Quality
Government 
Effectiveness
Political 
Stability
Political 
Stability
Log Land Area -0.0516*** 0.546***
[0.0027] [0.062]
Life Expectancy 0.001 0.0472**
(in 1985) [0.0011] [0.023]
Population Growth -0.758 -32.95***
(in 1985) [0.55] [9.26]
PCI1 90 4.489*** 2.955*** 3.752*** 5.092*** 4.409*** 2.08 -2.272*
[1.20] [0.98] [1.15] [1.70] [1.22] [1.78] [1.35]
Log Population 90 0.220** 0.185* 0.210** 0.328** 0.307*** 0.136 -0.119
[0.092] [0.095] [0.096] [0.14] [0.10] [0.17] [0.10]
Log GDP per capita -0.513*** -0.00429 Log GDP per capita 0.514*** 0.168** 0.395*** 0.418*** 0.452*** 0.486*** 0.0703
[0.17] [0.013] [0.091] [0.079] [0.096] [0.14] [0.12] [0.16] [0.12]
Polity score -0.00382 0.00279** Polity score -0.0083 0.0562*** 0.00215 0.0186 0.00394 -0.00211 -0.0311**
[0.022] [0.0011] [0.010] [0.012] [0.012] [0.018] [0.013] [0.019] [0.012]
Ethno-Ling. Fractionalization -1.183** -0.0048 Ethno-Ling. Fractionalization 0.084 0.475* 0.07 0.534 0.262 0.34 0.0785
[0.57] [0.031] [0.29] [0.26] [0.27] [0.48] [0.39] [0.47] [0.30]
Governance Indicators YES
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES Regional Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Legal Origin Fixed Effect YES YES Legal Origin Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
F-stat 90.02 29.67
Observations 306 306 306 310 310 310 310 310 306
R-squared 0.66 0.86 0.66 0.44 0.67 0.42 0.58 0.32 0.69
Intercepts omitted. Country-level clustered robust standard errors in brackets. All first stage F-stats are larger than 10. Sample comprises of non-democraticcountries (lag polity measure less than 5). Dependent
variables are from Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi's (2006) governance indices. GDP per capita and population are from the World DevelopmentIndex database. PCI is the population concentrationindex from our
calculation. Independentvariables are taken with lag. The beta coefficientsdisplay how much of a standard deviation of the dependent variable results from a change of a standard deviation in PCI. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9: Governance and PCI, No Relocated Capital Cities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Control for 
Corruption
Voice & 
Accountability Rule of Law
Regulation 
Quality
Government 
Effectiveness
Political 
Stability
Political 
Stability
A. Democratic Countries
PCI1 90 -0.643 0.099 -0.105 0.0794 0.211 -0.434
[0.81] [0.52] [0.59] [0.65] [0.66] [0.81]
Log GDP per capita 0.628*** 0.384*** 0.609*** 0.520*** 0.648*** 0.316***
[0.11] [0.066] [0.087] [0.096] [0.089] [0.10]
Log Population -0.158*** -0.0928*** -0.143*** -0.0980** -0.0714 -0.260***
[0.056] [0.031] [0.044] [0.042] [0.045] [0.058]
Polity score 0.0954*** 0.152*** 0.0941*** 0.0865** 0.0826** 0.138***
[0.036] [0.027] [0.029] [0.039] [0.033] [0.037]
Ethno-Ling. Fractionalization -0.219 -0.0422 -0.0888 0.172 0.133 -0.791***
[0.28] [0.17] [0.23] [0.24] [0.24] [0.30]
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Legal Origin Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 552 554 554 554 554 554
R-squared 0.85 0.81 0.88 0.73 0.87 0.69
B. Non-Democratic Countries
PCI1 90 2.664*** 1.678*** 2.100*** 2.899*** 2.433*** -0.599 -1.581*
[0.62] [0.53] [0.52] [0.85] [0.77] [0.85] [0.82]
Log GDP per capita 0.472*** 0.135* 0.377*** 0.348*** 0.408*** 0.484*** 0.374***
[0.079] [0.073] [0.080] [0.11] [0.097] [0.11] [0.12]
Log Population 0.0353 0.0157 0.0272 0.0658 0.0802 -0.161** -0.146**
[0.053] [0.041] [0.059] [0.082] [0.066] [0.065] [0.057]
Polity score -0.00169 0.0608*** 0.00749 0.0261* 0.0113 0.0128 -0.0127
[0.0089] [0.011] [0.0098] [0.015] [0.011] [0.016] [0.018]
Ethno-Ling. Fractionalization -0.132 0.321 -0.151 0.0924 -0.0712 -0.0879 -0.730**
[0.21] [0.21] [0.21] [0.42] [0.34] [0.32] [0.29]
Voice and Accountability 0.674***
[0.19]
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Legal Origin Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 319 323 323 323 323 323 123
R-squared 0.74 0.56 0.77 0.58 0.7 0.47 0.67
Intercept omitted. Country-level clustered robust standard errors in brackets. Panel A consists of countries with polity score
larger than 5, Panel B consists of countries with polity score les than or equal to 5. Dependent variables are from Kaufman,
Kraay and Mastruzzi's (2006) governance indices. GDP per capita and population are from the World Development Index
database. PCI is the population concentration index from our calculation. Independent variables are taken with lag. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11: Inequality, Redistribution and Population Concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Method OLS with Fixed Effects IV:Log(Dens.)
Dependent Variable Gini Ineq Q5/Q1 Gini
Time (Pre/Post-1990) Post Pre Post Post Post Post Post Post Post Post
Countries N.-D. N.-D. Democ. N.-D. N.-D. N.-D. N.-D. N.-D. N.-D. N.-D.
(Non-Democratic or Democratic)
Gross/Net Income Net Net Net Gross Net Gross Net Net Net Net
PCI1 90 -84.12* -61.780 -9.723 -14.130 -41.92** -29.660 -99.75*
[44.8] [44.8] [8.63] [39.4] [19.0] [34.1] [50.4]
Lag (Log Pop) -5.263** -3.569** 0.046 0.487 -2.376* -3.554 -2.009* -1.784 -0.178 -6.332**
[2.23] [1.66] [0.72] [3.31] [1.25] [2.07] [1.00] [1.62] [2.41] [2.83]
GiniPop 90 33.00**
[13.0]
Inv_Avg_Dist 90 -608.900
[385]
Cap Primacy 90 -6.896
[21.4]
Lag (Log GDP) -2.23 -4.14 -3.978*** -9.011*** -1.04 -6.894* -0.96 -2.51 -3.18 -2.62
[3.46] [3.60] [1.21] [2.88] [1.90] [3.56] [2.91] [3.34] [4.18] [3.61]
Consumption Dummy -2.33 -10.05 -2.663* 0.00 -3.55 0.00 -1.21 -2.44 -2.07 -2.55
[2.95] [5.84] [1.51] [0] [2.34] [0] [2.83] [3.03] [3.26] [2.88]
Ethno-Ling. Fract. 13.32 -15.17** 3.43 -15.03 13.17** -21.60 13.22* 17.97** 21.78** 11.66
[8.09] [7.04] [3.01] [12.6] [5.85] [20.4] [7.81] [7.44] [10.4] [8.88]
Lag (Polity) 0.188 1.530*** -0.896** 0.613 -0.013 0.320 0.190 0.345 0.169 0.195
[0.41] [0.52] [0.44] [0.43] [0.20] [0.47] [0.31] [0.43] [0.45] [0.40]
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Legal Origin Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 85 37 425 68 56 24 85 85 76 84
R-squared 0.59 0.89 0.83 0.54 0.45 0.60 0.61 0.56 0.58 0.59
Intercept omitted. Country-level clustered robust standard errors in brackets. Columns 1-9 uses OLS with regional and legal origin fixed effects. Column 10 uses lag of
log(density) as instrument for PCI. As marked, non-democratic countries are those with lag of polity less than 5, democratic countries the rest. Gross and net income inequalities
are classified from WIID 2.0 dataset. Consumption dummy signifies observations of inequality of consumption. The other variables are classified as in the text. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 12: Inequality by Quintiles and Population Concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Inequality Q5/Q1 Inequality Q5/Q2 Inequality Q5/Q3 Inequality Q5/Q4
PCI1 90 -39.47* -11.640 -5.681 -2.656
[20.0] [7.05] [3.98] [2.07]
Beta coefficient -0.509* -0.452 -0.431 -0.423
Log Population Size -2.284* -0.826* -0.418* -0.200*
[1.27] [0.46] [0.24] [0.11]
Log GDP per capita -1.226 -0.302 -0.129 -0.048
[1.94] [0.66] [0.33] [0.15]
Consumption Dummy -3.873 -1.442* -0.752* -0.391**
[2.41] [0.76] [0.37] [0.16]
Ethno-Ling. Fract. 12.85** 3.986* 1.987* 0.918*
[5.85] [2.08] [1.07] [0.50]
Polity Score 0.024 0.010 0.005 0.000
[0.21] [0.071] [0.035] [0.015]
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Legal Origin Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Observations 54 54 54 54
R-squared 0.44 0.54 0.57 0.62
Intercept omitted. Country-level clustered robust standard errors in brackets. The sample in all columns are restricted to post-
1990, non-democratic countries (lag polity less than 5), gross income distribution. Consumption dummy signifiesobservations
of inequalityof consumption. The other variables are classifiedas in the text. Beta coefficients represent the percentage effect
of one standard deviation change in PCI1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
